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YORK V. WAHKIAKUM SCHOOL DISTRICT AND THE 
FUTURE OF SCHOOL SEARCHES UNDER THE 
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION 
Kerem Murat Levitas 
Abstract: In March 2008, the Supreme Court of Washington decided York v. Wahkiakum 
School District,1 a case involving mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of student athletes. 
The court struck down the testing regime, but, unable to agree on the grounds for invalidating 
the testing, issued three separate opinions. The lead opinion argued that suspicionless testing 
could never be countenanced under the Washington Constitution. Two concurrences argued 
that suspicionless testing could be permissible under certain circumstances pursuant to a 
variant of the federal special-needs doctrine. This Note reviews search-and-seizure 
protections under the United States and Washington constitutions, their application to school 
search law, and gives an overview of York. Finally, this Note argues that jurisprudential, 
democratic, and educational values all counsel in favor of following York’s lead opinion and 
maintaining an individualized-suspicion requirement for school searches. 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 2008, a divided Supreme Court of Washington decided York 
v. Wahkiakum School District, a case that involved a suspicionless drug-
testing regime in which the school district tested all of its student-
athletes. While the court’s nine justices unanimously struck down the 
program as a violation of article 1, section 7 (Section 7) of the 
Washington State Constitution, they did not produce a majority opinion. 
The lead opinion, written by Justice Sanders and signed by three other 
justices, rejected the federal special-needs exception to the warrant 
requirement in the school context. Two concurrences, one written by 
Justice Madsen and signed by three other justices, and the other written 
by Justice James Johnson, argued that the State Constitution does allow 
for a special-needs exception in Washington schools, but that the facts 
before the court did not satisfy the requirements of that exception. 
This split decision provides no clear answers to school districts, 
students, school administrators, practitioners, or lower courts as to 
whether a special-needs exception exists for Washington’s public 
schools. Clear doctrine on this point is critically important for all 
stakeholders: students must know the parameters of their privacy rights, 
                                                     
1. 163 Wash. 2d 297, 178 P.3d 995 (2008). 
KEREM FEB2009.DOC 3/8/2009  12:18 PM 
Washington Law Review Vol. 84:93, 2009 
94 
schools need to plan for drug control within clearly defined contours of 
the law, and the uniform administration of justice requires that lower 
courts have clear directives. This Note weighs the strengths and 
weaknesses of the various opinions and argues that the Supreme Court 
of Washington should adhere to a bright-line requirement of 
individualized suspicion for all school searches.  
Part I compares the basic jurisprudence of the U.S. Constitution’s 
Fourth Amendment with Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution 
and shows that the state provision more vigorously protects the privacy 
of Washington residents than do the federal guarantees. Part II explains 
how Fourth Amendment rules apply to searches performed in schools 
and shows that they allow for suspicionless drug testing of students. Part 
III introduces Washington cases that have applied Section 7 in the 
school context, and demonstrates that the opinions have all relied upon 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing when upholding invasions of 
students’ privacy. Part IV presents York v. Wahkiakum School District, 
describing the underlying controversy and summarizing the court’s three 
major opinions. Finally, Part V argues that Washington courts should 
follow the lead opinion’s approach in York when evaluating school 
searches, as jurisprudential, democratic, and educational values all 
counsel in favor of an individualized-suspicion requirement. 
I.  THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION PROVIDES BROADER 
SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE PROTECTIONS THAN THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. The Fourth Amendment’s Prohibition on Unreasonable Searches 
Allows Many Warrantless Searches 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution contains two 
different clauses. The Search Clause guarantees “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures[.]”2 The Warrant Clause commands 
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”3 
A search occurs if a state actor intrudes upon an individual’s “actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy,” where that expectation is one that 
                                                     
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
3. Id. 
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“society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 4 A search occurs only 
if both conditions are present.5 
There is disagreement, however, about how to evaluate whether a 
search satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court has historically interpreted the 
guarantees of the Search Clause in the context of the Warrant Clause.6 
Under this view, the U.S. Constitution requires that law-enforcement 
officers have a warrant authorizing a search in order to satisfy the 
reasonableness requirement.7 As the Court emphasized in its landmark 
Katz v. United States8 decision, a search conducted “without prior 
approval by judge or magistrate, [is] per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions.”9 
Another school of thought views the Warrant Clause as delineating 
the requirements for a warrant, not the bounds of reasonableness.10 This 
perspective argues that the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a 
government search, therefore, is “reasonableness.”11 The Court appears 
to have adopted this approach recently, divorcing its search analysis 
from the Warrant Clause.12 In Samson v. California,13 for example, the 
                                                     
4. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95–96 (1990). See also United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 
109, 113 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 
735, 740 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). This 
definition applies to state as well as federal authorities, because Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961), made Fourth Amendment strictures applicable to the states. 
5. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005) (holding that dog sniffs for drugs 
are not searches, because they can detect only contraband, and society does not recognize a 
subjective privacy interest in contraband as reasonable); Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–43 (holding that 
installation of a pen register is not a search, because people have no subjective expectation of 
privacy in information (i.e., phone numbers dialed) that they convey to the phone company). 
6. See Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1994) (arguing that the “warrant clause informs the judiciary of the type of 
search that is reasonable . . . . ”). 
7. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 
762 (1994). 
8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
9. Id. at 357 (footnote omitted). 
10. See Amar, supra note 7, at 762 (positing that the reasonableness clause requires that all 
searches be reasonable while the warrant clause “addresses the narrower issue of warrants.”). 
11. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 
U.S. 56, 66 (1950), overruled on other grounds by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
12. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360 (2001) (“The touchstone of our analysis 
under the Fourth Amendment is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 
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Court explained its “general Fourth Amendment approach” without once 
referring to the Warrant Clause.14 Instead, it applied a reasonableness 
balancing test,15 “examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances” and 
“assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes 
upon the individual’s privacy, and on the other, the degree to which it is 
needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”16 Using 
this test, the Court upheld the suspicionless search of a parolee in good 
standing, concluding that the government’s “‘overwhelming interest’ in 
supervising parolees”17 outweighed the parolee’s “severely diminished 
expectations of privacy,” which exist “by virtue of their status alone.”18 
Extending its balancing-test jurisprudence, the Court established a 
“special needs” category of searches. Under this exception to the warrant 
requirement, a law-enforcement official may conduct searches without a 
warrant or probable cause when (1) a special need for the search beyond 
ordinary law enforcement exists, and (2) obtaining a warrant or 
establishing probable cause would be impractical.19 If both requirements 
are met, the Court employs the same balancing test articulated in 
Samson. The Court has used special-needs balancing to sanction 
suspicionless-search programs in several cases. For example, the Court 
has approved the suspicionless drug testing of customs officials, based 
on the “special need” of “deter[ring] drug use among those eligible for 
promotion to sensitive positions . . . .”20 The Court also sanctioned 
                                                     
governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); 
United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (describing a “general touchstone of 
reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment analysis”); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 
(1991) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”). 
13. 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
14. Id. at 848 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). 
15. The Court first articulated its balancing test in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967), which applied Fourth Amendment restrictions to administrative searches. The Court 
expanded the reach of the balancing test to the criminal search-and-seizure context in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968). JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 277 (4th ed. 2006); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. 
KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 229 (4th ed. 2004) (describing a “Camara balancing test” and 
arguing that a theoretical basis for it “did not clearly emerge until the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Camara[.]”). 
16. Samson, 547 U.S. at 848 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001)). 
17. Id. at 853. 
18. Id. at 852, 854–56. 
19. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
20. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989). 
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random drunk-driving checkpoints, as they addressed the special danger 
that drunk driving poses to community safety.21 In short, the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement has allowed for searches 
based on reasonableness balancing and, in certain circumstances, 
special-needs rather than strict adherence to the warrant and probable 
cause standard. 
B. Article I, Section 7 Provides Broader Search Protections and 
Presumes that All Searches Require Warrants 
Washington courts have not always consistently applied Section 7 
when deciding search-and-seizure cases. Section 7 entered a period of 
dormancy after 1961’s Mapp v. Ohio,22 which made Fourth Amendment 
protections applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause.23 
Effectively, Fourth Amendment law provided such a high bar of rights 
that Washington courts generally did not analyze their own 
constitution’s protections during this period.24 However, when the 
pendulum swung the other way and Fourth Amendment rights were cut 
back under the Burger25 and Rehnquist Courts,26 Washington courts 
reasserted an independent reading of Section 7.27 
                                                     
21. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 38 (2000) (fitting Michigan Dep’t of State 
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), into the special-needs framework by describing the city’s drug 
interdiction checkpoints as designed to address the “immediate hazard posed by . . . drunk drivers” 
and not aimed at “detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing”). 
22. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
23. See George R. Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U. 
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331, 332 (1985) (commenting on the effect on Section 7 of Mapp, 367 U.S. 
at 655 (“We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution 
is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”)). 
24. Nock, supra note 23, at 332; see also State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 698–99, 674 P.2d 
1240, 1247 (1983) (describing the Supreme Court of Washington’s neglect of Section 7 in favor of 
Fourth Amendment protections). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21, 824 (1982) (holding that probable 
cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband justifies warrantless search of any area of the vehicle 
where such contraband is likely to be found); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981) 
(holding that lawful arrest of the former occupants of a vehicle justifies search of entire passenger 
compartment including closed containers and glove box); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 
88–90, 95 (1980) (creating Fourth Amendment standing doctrine); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 
U.S. 31, 39–40 (1979) (allowing evidence from a search pursuant to a statute later found to be 
unconstitutionally vague). 
26. See, e.g., Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 467 (1999) (allowing warrantless search 
anywhere in a vehicle where there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence); 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996) (holding that a pretextual traffic stop does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment); Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451–53 
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Today, Section 7 is broadly acknowledged to provide greater 
protections than the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, many Section 7 
protections were developed as specific reactions to federal cases that 
restricted Fourth Amendment guarantees.28 Independent analysis is now 
so well established that courts forego the typical analysis required to 
determine if a state-constitutional provision offers greater protection 
than its federal counterpart.29 
The text of Section 7 stands in fairly significant contrast to the Fourth 
Amendment. It provides, in its entirety, “No person shall be disturbed in 
his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”30 
Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which has a Search Clause that requires 
reasonableness and a Warrant Clause that requires probable cause, 
Section 7 provides a single guarantee: no disturbances of private affairs 
without authority of law. This different wording and structure have 
required different interpretive paradigms that, in turn, provide greater 
individual protections in certain circumstances.31 
                                                     
(1990) (finding suspicionless drunk-driving checkpoints did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
where all drivers were stopped and officer discretion was limited by the program). 
27. See Nock, supra note 23, at 333, 352. 
28. Compare State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 181, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980) (interpreting 
Section 7 to confer automatic standing), with United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 88–90, 95 
(1980) (creating Fourth Amendment standing doctrine); compare also State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 
92, 104, 640 P.2d 1061, 1068 (1982) (excluding evidence from a search pursuant to a statute later 
found “flagrantly unconstitutional in its vagueness”), with Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 39–
40 (1979) (allowing evidence from a search pursuant to a statute later found unconstitutionally 
vague); compare also State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 700–03, 674 P.2d 1240, 1248–50 (1983) 
(disapproving warrantless car searches after drivers have exited the vehicles and have been lawfully 
arrested outside of the vehicles), with United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21, 824 (1982) 
(holding probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband justifies warrantless search of any 
area of the vehicle where such contraband is likely to be found), and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 
454, 460–61 (1981) (holding that lawful arrest of the former occupants of a vehicle justifies search 
of entire passenger compartment, including closed containers and glove box). 
29.  State v. Rankin, 151 Wash. 2d 689, 694, 92 P.3d 202, 204–05 (2004); State v. McKinney, 
148 Wash. 2d 20, 26, 60 P.3d 46, 48–49 (2002); State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 347–48, 979 
P.2d 833, 837 (1999). 
30. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
31. See McKinney, 148 Wash. 2d at 26, 60 P.3d at 48–49 (stating that it is settled that Section 7 is 
both qualitatively different and provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment in certain 
circumstances); Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d at 348–49, 979 P.2d at 837 (stating that it is well established 
that Section 7 has broader application than the Fourth Amendment); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 
506, 510, 688 P.2d 151, 153 (1984) (remarking that Section 7’s unique language provides greater 
protections than the Fourth Amendment); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d 419, 
422 (1984) (stating that the unique language of Section 7 allows Washington courts to provide 
heightened protections against searches and seizures); see also State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 
436–39, 688 P.2d 136, 139–41 (1984) (applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test for assessing probable 
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Washington’s search-and-seizure analytical framework is now well 
established. Washington courts first inquire whether a state actor has 
invaded a citizen’s private affairs.32 If so, they ask: Did the state actor 
have authority of law for that invasion?33 
Section 7’s “private affairs” language gives Washington citizens 
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. Under the Fourth 
Amendment, a search occurs only if a state agent invades a subjective 
privacy expectation that was objectively reasonable.34 The Washington 
test, on the other hand, focuses on “those privacy interests which citizens 
of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from 
governmental trespass absent a warrant.”35 The difference is significant 
because Section 7 protections are “not confined to the subjective privacy 
expectations of modern citizens who, due to well publicized advances in 
surveillance technology, are learning to expect diminished privacy in 
many aspects of their lives.”36 
If a Washington court determines that a private interest or affair is 
implicated, it turns to the second analytical step: determining whether 
that disturbance was sanctioned by “authority of law.”37 The Supreme 
Court of Washington has interpreted “authority of law” to express a 
strong preference for a warrant, stating that while “a Fourth Amendment 
analysis hinges on whether a warrantless seizure is reasonable . . . an 
article I, section 7 analysis hinges on whether a seizure is permitted by 
‘authority of law’—in other words, a warrant.”38 Unlike the Fourth 
Amendment, Section 7 contains no textual basis to allow searches based 
on a reasonableness balancing test, as the Section 7 default requires 
                                                     
cause based on an informant’s tips despite the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the test in Illinois 
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)); Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 698–99, 674 P.2d at 1247 (departing from 
the Fourth Amendment standard for the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement); Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 178–79, 622 P.2d at 1205 (finding “ample basis for 
interpreting Const. art. 1, § 7 as more protective than the federal constitution”).  
32. McKinney, 148 Wash. 2d at 27, 60 P.3d at 49; City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 
260, 270, 868 P.2d 134, 139 (1994); Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 510, 688 P.2d at 153–54. 
33. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d at 270, 868 P.2d at 139. 
34. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741–43 (1979) (holding that installation of a pen 
register is not a search, because people have no subjective expectation of privacy in information 
(i.e., phone numbers dialed) that they convey to the phone company). 
35. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d at 511, 688 P.2d at 154. 
36. Id. 
37. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d at 270, 868 P.2d at 139. 
38. State v. Hatchie, 161 Wash. 2d 390, 397, 166 P.3d 698, 702–03 (2007); see also York v. 
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 163 Wash. 2d 297, 306, 178 P.3d 995, 1001 (2008). 
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authority of law.39 Indeed, Section 7 “poses an almost absolute bar to 
warrantless arrests, searches and seizures, with only limited 
exceptions . . . .”40 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Washington has 
recognized fewer exceptions to the warrant requirement than the U.S. 
Supreme Court,41 and it draws those exceptions more narrowly.42 
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPLIES TO SCHOOLS AND 
ALLOWS SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING 
A. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the U.S. Supreme Court Applied the 
Fourth Amendment to Searches of Students by School Officials, but 
Departed from the Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements 
The U.S. Supreme Court first faced the issue of whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies to school officials in New Jersey v. T.L.O.43 A high-
school teacher discovered two students smoking in a school bathroom 
and took them to see Assistant Vice Principal Theodore Choplick.44 One 
of the students, T.L.O., not only denied that she had been smoking, but 
also insisted that she did not smoke at all.45 Choplick demanded to see 
the contents of her purse.46 Inside the purse he discovered a pack of 
                                                     
39. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also Hatchie, 161 Wash. 2d at 397, 166 P.3d at 702–03; York, 
163 Wash. 2d at 331 n.25, 178 P.3d at 1014 n.3 (Johnson, J.M., J., concurring) (“The Washington 
Constitution is notably not based on a reasonableness standard . . . .”); Charles W. Johnson & Scott 
P. Beetham, The Origin of Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, 31 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 431, 462 (2008) (noting that Section 7 does not include reasonableness and probable-cause 
requirements). 
40. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983). 
41. Compare State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833, 838 (1999) (listing six 
exceptions to the warrant requirement—consent, exigent circumstances, incident to arrest, 
inventories, plain view, and investigatory stops) (citing Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington 
Search and Seizure Law: 1988 Update, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 411, 528–80 (1988)), with 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he 
‘warrant requirement’ [has] become so riddled with exceptions that it [is] basically unrecognizable . 
. . .”) (citing Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 
1473–74 (1985), which lists more than twenty exceptions to the warrant requirement). 
42. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 151 Wash. 2d 793, 802–03, 92 P.3d 228, 232–33 (2004) 
(limiting scope of community caretaking function); State v. White, 135 Wash. 2d 761, 770–71, 958 
P.2d 982, 987 (1998) (limiting inventory searches of automobiles to unlocked compartments); State 
v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 821–22, 676 P.2d 419, 424 (1984) (limiting scope of search 
incident to arrest). 
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cigarettes and cigarette rolling papers, which he associated with 
marijuana use.47 Suspecting that a more thorough search would yield 
evidence of drug use, he searched the purse more completely and found 
marijuana, a pipe, plastic bags, and forty dollars, mostly in one-dollar 
bills.48 Choplick then opened a zippered compartment, where he found a 
list of students who owed T.L.O. money and two letters implicating her 
in selling marijuana.49 He called T.LO.’s mother and gave the evidence 
to the police.50 
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment applies to school officials 
because, as state officials, they could not claim the immunity from 
Fourth Amendment strictures that parents enjoy when disciplining their 
children.51 It did not impose the warrant and probable-cause 
requirements, however, because these requirements would hamper the 
quick maintenance of school order52 and require teachers to “school[] 
themselves in the niceties of probable cause . . . .”53 
Instead, the Court started its analysis with what it identified as the 
“fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment”: “that searches and 
seizures be reasonable.”54 While “both . . . probable cause and . . . a 
warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, . . . in certain limited 
circumstances neither is required.”55 The Court applied a balancing test 
to evaluate reasonableness, weighing “the schoolchild’s legitimate 
expectations of privacy and the school’s equally legitimate need to 
maintain an environment in which learning can take place . . . .”56 The 
Court held that a school search is reasonable where a school official has 
reasonable grounds for suspecting a search will yield evidence of 
wrongdoing, and the search measures are related to the object of the 
search and are not excessively invasive.57 The Court refused to decide 
                                                     
47. Id. 
48. Id. See also State In Interest of T.L.O., 463 A.2d 934, 936 (N.J. 1983) (“The purse also 
contained $40, most of it in one-dollar bills.”). 
49. T.L.O, 469 U.S. at 328. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 336–37. 
52. Id. at 340. 
53. Id. at 343. 
54. Id. at 340. 
55. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 341–42. 
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whether individual suspicion was necessary for a reasonableness 
finding.58 
Choplick’s search of T.L.O. was found to be reasonable because the 
teacher’s report that T.L.O. had been smoking gave Mr. Choplick a 
reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had cigarettes, and “her purse was the 
obvious place in which to find them.”59 The discovery of rolling papers 
provided a reasonable basis to search for other evidence of marijuana 
use, a conclusion T.L.O. did not dispute.60 Choplick’s subsequent 
discovery of a pipe, plastic bags, marijuana, and money also made it 
reasonable to open the zippered compartment in T.L.O.’s purse and read 
her letters.61 
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment but was troubled by the 
Court’s apparent drift towards applying the balancing test as a rule, 
rather than as an exception.62 For Justice Blackmun, the only thing that 
justified using the balancing test, instead of the warrant and probable 
cause requirement, was that “the elementary and secondary school 
setting presents a special need for flexibility justifying a departure from 
the balance struck by the Framers.”63 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. He took 
exception to the majority’s emphasis on reasonableness, which 
“jettison[ed] the probable-cause standard—the only one that finds 
support in the text of the Fourth Amendment.”64 Relying on 
reasonableness alone, he argued, was a departure that “finds support 
neither in precedent nor policy.”65 Justice Brennan held fast to the view 
that the reasonableness clause is informed by the warrant and probable 
cause requirements. He argued that “[f]or all . . . but narrowly defined 
intrusions, the requisite ‘balancing’ has been performed in centuries of 
precedent and is embodied in the principle that [searches and] seizures 
are ‘reasonable’ only if supported by probable cause.”66 
                                                     
58. Id. at 342 n.8 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 (1976)). 
59. Id. at 345–46. 
60. Id. at 347. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
63. Id. at 351–52 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
64. Id. at 357–58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 214 
(1979)). 
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Brennan also faulted the reasonableness balancing test itself, 
describing it as “Rohrschach-like”67 and “amorphous,”68 with little 
capacity to constrain judicial decision-making.69 He warned of a 
“conceptual free-for-all” should “an unguided balancing test [be] used to 
assess specific categories of searches.”70 For Justice Brennan, the 
balancing test was merely a way of “reaching a predetermined 
conclusion acceptable to this Court’s impressions of what authority 
teachers need . . . .”71 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Applied Special-Needs Balancing to 
School Searches to Allow Suspicionless Drug Testing 
The Court next considered the Fourth Amendment’s application to 
searches of students in Vernonia School District v. Acton.72 Drug use had 
not historically been a problem in the Vernonia schools.73 In the mid- to 
late-1980s, however, teachers and administrators noticed a marked 
increase in drug use and disciplinary problems.74 Students were “in a 
state of rebellion . . . fueled by alcohol and drug abuse . . . .”75 School 
District administrators were particularly concerned about student-athlete 
drug use because the athletes were leaders of the student drug culture 
and drug use also increased their “risk of sports-related injury.”76 The 
District tried education-based deterrence efforts, but drug use 
continued.77 Finally, the District called a parental input meeting to 
consider a proposed drug-testing policy, which the attendees 
unanimously supported.78 
The District’s mandatory drug-testing policy applied to all students 
participating in interscholastic athletics.79 Athletes were tested once at 
                                                     
67. Id. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
68. Id. at 359 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
69. See id. at 357–58, 360, 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
70. Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
71. Id. at 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
72. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
73. Id. at 648. 
74. Id. at 648–49 (1995). 
75. Id. at 649. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 649 (noting that the School District offered classes, speakers, and presentations in an 
attempt to deter drug use). 
78. Id. at 649–50. 
79. Id. at 650. 
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the beginning of the season.80 During the season, they could be tested 
again if their name was drawn in a weekly random drawing.81 Male 
athletes produced a sample at a urinal with a monitor standing ten to 
fifteen feet behind them.82 Females urinated into a specimen cup while 
inside a closed bathroom stall, with the monitor outside listening for 
sounds of urination.83 After receiving samples from the children, 
monitors checked them for temperature and signs of tampering before 
submitting them to an independent laboratory for testing.84 
In 1991, James Acton, a seventh grader at a Vernonia School District 
school, signed up to play football.85 He and his parents refused to 
consent to drug testing, so he was told he could not join the team.86 
Acton and his parents sued the school district, arguing that the program 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights.87 
The Court applied the same balancing test it had used in T.L.O. and 
upheld the testing regime.88 The Court found that students generally 
enjoy a “lesser expectation of privacy,”89 and that athletes, specifically, 
had a further diminished privacy expectation because they shower and 
change communally and subject themselves to a higher degree of 
regulation.90 The Court described the alleged invasion of this diminished 
privacy expectation as “not significant”91 because, when producing a 
sample, male students remained clothed, while females were in stalls, 
and because the urinalysis results were disclosed “to a limited class of 
school personnel.”92 
The Court balanced this invasion against the “important—indeed 
perhaps compelling” governmental interest in deterring student drug 
use.93 Deterrence was particularly important because of the special need 







86. Id. at 651. 
87. Id. 
88. See id. at 652–57. 
89. Id. at 657 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)). 
90. Id. at 657. 
91. Id. at 660. 
92. Id. at 658. 
93. Id. at 661. 
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to maintain order in schools, promote the learning process, and prevent 
the harmful effects of drug use, which are more severe on developing 
bodies and nervous systems.94 The Court also agreed that it was rational 
to focus on student-athletes, not only because of “the ‘role model’ effect 
of athletes’ drug use,”95 but also because “the risk of immediate physical 
harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is 
particularly high.”96 Like in T.L.O., the Court found that requiring a 
warrant or probable cause would interfere with quickly maintaining 
school order.97 
Seven years later, in Board of Education of Independent School 
District of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,98 the Court upheld 
suspicionless drug testing for all student participants in extracurricular 
activities. The Court deemed the diminished privacy interests of student-
athletes that supported testing in Acton to be “not essential” to that 
decision.99 As for the drug problem, the local school superintendent 
“repeatedly described [it] as ‘not . . . major.’”100 Nevertheless, the Earls 
Court declared that the immediacy and role of athletes in the drug 
problem noted in Acton were “not essential to the holding.”101  
III. WASHINGTON COURTS HAVE ALWAYS REQUIRED 
INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION FOR SCHOOL SEARCHES 
A. The Supreme Court of Washington Applied the Reasonable 
Suspicion Standard to School Searches in 1977 
The Supreme Court of Washington confronted school searches in 
State v. McKinnon,102 decided eight years before T.L.O. In 1977, the 
issue had split state high courts across the country.103 The McKinnon 
majority, like several federal and state courts, applied a standard that 
                                                     
94. Id. at 661–62. 
95. Id. at 663. 
96. Id. at 662. 
97. Id. at 653. 
98. 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
99. Id. at 831. 
100. Id. at 843 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 838. 
102. 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977). 
103. See Bill O. Heder, The Development of Search and Seizure Law in Public Schools, BYU 
EDUC. & L.J., Winter 1999, at 71, 94 (describing disparate approaches to the applicability of the 
Fourth Amendment to school searches across state and federal courts). 
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resembled that which the T.L.O. Court would later develop: applying the 
Fourth Amendment to school officials as state actors, but requiring only 
reasonable suspicion for a valid search.104 Some state high courts, on the 
other hand, had held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to school 
officials because they act in loco parentis with their authority derived 
from parents and not the state.105 
In McKinnon, an informant told the Snoqualmie, Washington police 
chief that two students, Raymond Yates and Walter McKinnon, were 
selling amphetamines and identified the pockets where they kept the 
drugs.106 The chief of police telephoned the local high-school principal 
with the information.107 The principal escorted Yates into his office, 
while the vice-principal took McKinnon into his own office.108 At the 
principal’s direction, Yates emptied his pockets—except the one the 
informant had identified as containing the drugs.109 The principal 
reached inside that pocket and removed two packets of white pills.110 He 
then proceeded to the vice principal’s office where he reached into 
McKinnon’s pocket, again finding white pills where the informant said 
they would be.111 The principal called the police chief, who arrested both 
students.112 
Although the McKinnon court purported not to decide whether a 
school official was a state actor for Fourth Amendment purposes, 113 the 
court nevertheless applied a Fourth Amendment analysis when 
considering the lawfulness of the principal’s search. The court held that 
a search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment where a school 
                                                     
104. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 81, 558 P.2d at 784; see also Heder, supra note 103, at 94 (citing 
Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 981 (6th Cir. 1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th 
Cir. 1984); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1982); Bellnier v. 
Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).  
105. Heder, supra note 103, at 94 (citing D.R.C. v. State, 646 P.2d 252, 260 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1982); In re Thomas G., 90 Cal. Rptr. 361, 363–64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. 
Rptr. 220, 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W.2d 552, 553–54 (Tex. App. 1983); 
Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. App. 1970)). 
106. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d at 77, 558 P.2d at 782. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 77, 558 P.2d at 782–83. 
110. Id. at 77, 558 P.2d at 783. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 78, 558 P.2d at 783. 
113. Id. 
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official has reasonable grounds to believe the search is necessary to 
maintain school order.114 
The court identified six factors to consider when determining whether 
a school official had reasonable grounds to search a student: “the child’s 
age, history, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness of the 
problem in the school to which the search was directed, the exigency to 
make the search without delay, and the probative value and reliability of 
the information used as a justification for the search.”115 Thus, the court 
still evaluated individual circumstances when determining if a school 
search was justified, but did not explicitly decide whether the new rule 
required individualized suspicion. 
B. Kuehn v. Renton School District Emphasized that School Searches 
Require Individualized Suspicion of Wrongdoing 
In Kuehn v. Renton School District, 116 decided only four days before 
T.L.O., the Supreme Court of Washington squarely confronted the issue 
of individualized suspicion in the school context. Kuehn dealt with a 
high school’s mandatory pre-departure luggage search policy for school 
music ensemble trips. Although the trips were not required, they were 
considered the highlight of the music ensemble year.117 The school 
implemented the policy after two students were found with liquor in 
their hotel rooms during a trip to Astoria, Oregon.118 
High-school senior Adam Kuehn and his parents objected to a search 
prior to a music trip to Vancouver, Canada.119 They tried and failed to 
negotiate a compromise with the school so he would not miss the 
group’s trip.120 Kuehn arrived on the day of the trip with a locked 
suitcase and a note from his mother saying that she had checked his 
baggage, that it contained nothing illegal, and that Kuehn wanted only 
                                                     
114. Id. at 81, 558 P.2d at 784. 
115. Id. at 81, 558 P.2d at 785. 
116. 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985). 
117. Brief of Respondent at 2, Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist., 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 
(1985) (No. 49873-3). 
118. Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d at 596, 694 P.2d at 1079. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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customs officials to search it.121 Kuehn was barred from participating in 
the trip.122 
Kuehn and his parents filed a civil-rights claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 alleging that the school’s policy had violated Kuehn’s Fourth 
Amendment rights. They also asserted violations of Kuehn’s rights 
under Section 7.123 The family focused on the fact that Kuehn had done 
nothing to arouse any suspicion of wrongdoing, arguing that “[t]he 
absence of suspicion individually focused on plaintiff (or any of his 
classmates) is fatal to defendants’ effort to establish that its mass search 
policy is reasonable.”124 The School District argued that the 
suspicionless search of Kuehn’s luggage met the McKinnon standard 
because “minors consuming alcohol while on a Tour with other band 
members, parents and teachers is highly disruptive of school discipline 
and order.”125 Because the purpose of the search was not criminal 
investigation, the District argued, individualized suspicion was not 
necessary.126 
The court took pains to delineate a requirement of individual 
suspicion for school searches.127 In the court’s view, the factors 
prescribed in McKinnon for determining whether a search was based on 
a reasonable belief “evidence the requirement of individualized 
suspicion.”128 The “statistical probability that someone [in a group] will 
have contraband in his possession” could not satisfy that requirement.129 
Rather, “[t]he Fourth Amendment demands more than a generalized 
probability; it requires that the suspicion be particularized with respect to 
each individual searched.”130 The court was absolute with respect to its 
view of searches lacking individual suspicion: “In the absence of 
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the search is a general search. 
We never authorize general, exploratory searches.”131 Because the 
                                                     
121. Id. at 596, 694 P.2d at 1079–80. 
122. Id. at 596, 694 P.2d at 1080. 
123. Id.  
124. Brief of Appellants at 24, Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist., 103 Wash. 2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 
(1985) (No. 49873-3). 
125. Brief of Respondents, supra note 117, at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
126. Id. at 30. 
127. See Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d at 598–99, 694 P.2d at 1080–81. 
128. Id. at 599, 694 P.2d at 1081. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. (emphasis added). 
131. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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school officials had no reason to believe they would find anything in 
Kuehn’s baggage, the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights.132 
While Kuehn alleged violations of both the Fourth Amendment and 
Section 7, the court characterized his claim as arising from a deprivation 
of a federal right.133 As such, the court focused almost exclusively on 
violations of the Fourth Amendment. Even so, the case was decided 
during the beginnings of the section’s independent interpretation, and the 
Kuehns’ brief had provided a separate analysis of Section 7.134 The court 
accepted the invitation. Its analysis concludes that “[t]he general search 
is anathema to Fourth Amendment and Const. art. 1 § 7 protections, and 
except for the most compelling situations, should not be 
countenanced.”135 
C. Since Kuehn, Washington Appellate Courts Have Upheld School 
Searches Only When Based on Individualized Suspicion 
The first post-Kuehn case to examine school searches, State v. 
Brooks,136 upheld a locker search because it was based on reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing. School officials received a tip that Steve 
Brooks was selling marijuana out of a blue metal box in a locker.137 
When school officials opened the locker, they found the blue box, which 
they could not open.138 They removed Brooks from class and told him to 
open the box or they would call the police.139 He opened it to reveal 
hallucinogenic mushrooms, which he admitted he had been selling to 
students.140 School officials then called the police, who arrested 
Brooks.141 
The court upheld the search under both the Fourth Amendment and 
Section 7. The court understood both T.L.O. and McKinnon to establish 
a reasonable-grounds predicate for school searches.142 Accordingly, the 
                                                     
132. Id. at 599–600, 694 P.2d at 1081. 
133. See id. at 598, 694 P.2d at 1080 (“This action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). 
134. Brief of Appellants, supra note 124, at 40–42. 
135. Id. at 601–02, 694 P.2d at 1082 (emphasis added). 
136. 43 Wash. App. 560, 718 P.2d 837 (1986). 
137. Id. at 561, 718 P.2d at 837. 




142. Id. at 567–68, 718 P.2d at 840–41. 
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court concluded that “article 1, section 7 affords students no greater 
protections from searches by school officials than is guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment.”143 Under the T.L.O. standard, the court found 
“there were reasonable grounds for the school officials to suspect that 
the search would turn up evidence that Brooks had violated or was 
violating either the law or the rules of the school.”144 
The next school-search case, State v. Slattery,145 also involved a 
school official who had reason to suspect a student of selling drugs at 
school. Vice Principal Sterling Thurston received reports that Mike 
Slattery was selling marijuana and had been involved with drugs.146 
Thurston called Slattery into his office and demanded that he empty his 
pockets, which revealed $230 in cash and a pager number—both of 
which Thurston associated with drug dealing.147 Thurston called a 
security officer, who searched Slattery’s locker, found nothing and then 
moved on to Slattery’s car.148 Slattery initially refused the car search,149 
but acquiesced after he spoke with his mother on the phone.150 In the car, 
the security officer found a pager and a notebook with names and dollar 
amounts. He proceeded to search the locked trunk and discovered a 
locked briefcase.151 Slattery denied owning the briefcase or knowing the 
combination.152 The security officer pried it open and discovered 80.2 
grams of marijuana.153 Slattery was charged and convicted for 
possession with intent to distribute marijuana.154 
A Washington appellate court concluded that the school officials had 
reasonable grounds to search Slattery’s person, car, and briefcase.155 The 
informant’s tip, Slattery’s reputation for drug problems, his possession 
of a large amount of cash, and a pager number “reasonably could lead 
                                                     
143. Id. at 568, 718 P.2d at 841. 
144. Id. at 565, 718 P.2d at 839. 
145. 56 Wash. App. 820, 787 P.2d 932 (1990). 









155. Id. at 825–26, 787 P.2d at 934–35. 
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the principal to expect to find drugs in appellant’s possession.”156 When 
school officials did not find drugs on his person, “they logically went 
outside to search his car . . . .”157 The McKinnon factors also supported a 
reasonableness finding.158 The court did not separately analyze the 
warrantless entry of the briefcase. 
Finally, in State v. B.A.S.,159 an appellate court held that school 
officials must have reason to suspect a student of a particular violation, 
and that there must be a correlation between the suspected violation and 
the scope of the search. The local school had a policy that prohibited 
students from leaving the school, including trips to the parking lot, 
during school hours.160 Under the policy, a violation was grounds for a 
search.161 A school-attendance officer, David Halford, discovered B.A.S. 
and three other students twenty feet from the parking lot.162 Halford 
believed that B.A.S. had been in a nearby field, as the bottom of his 
pants were wet, while the parking lot was dry.163 Halford also checked 
with the school’s records and discovered that B.A.S. was missing 
class.164 In order to determine if B.A.S. had any prohibited items, 
Halford asked him to empty his pockets, which contained a black case 
with plastic bags of marijuana inside.165 
The court acknowledged that Halford had reason to suspect B.A.S. of 
leaving campus during school hours, but not to suspect B.A.S. of the 
particular behavior for which he was searching—possessing 
contraband.166 Indeed, “there was no evidence . . . of a correlation 
between a student’s violation of the closed campus policy and a 
likelihood he or she is bringing contraband onto campus.”167 While the 
court noted that a school could punish a student for breaking a rule, it 
                                                     
156. Id. at 825, 787 P.2d at 934–35. 
157. Id. at 826, 787 P.2d at 935. 
158. Id. at 825–26, 787 P.2d at 934–35. 
159. 103 Wash. App. 549, 13 P.3d 244 (2000). 
160. Id. at 551, 13 P.3d 245. 
161. Id. at 551–52, 13 P.3d at 245. 




166. Id. at 554, 13 P.3d at 246–47. 
167. Id. at 554, 13 P.3d at 246. 
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held that “violating that rule without more does not warrant an automatic 
search.”168 
IV. YORK STRUCK DOWN A SUSPICIONLESS DRUG-TESTING 
PROGRAM BUT DID NOT PRODUCE A MAJORITY OPINION 
A. Two Families Challenged the Wahkiakum County School District’s 
Mandatory Suspicionless Drug-Testing Program 
By the mid-1990s, Wahkiakum County School District leaders 
concluded that their community suffered from a teenage drug 
problem.169 A 1994 survey revealed that forty-five percent of tenth 
graders and sixty-five percent of twelfth graders had used some illegal 
drug besides alcohol.170 In 1995 and 1997, thirty-four percent and thirty-
one percent, respectively, of the high-school student body reported using 
marijuana in the last thirty days.171 The School District implemented 
numerous policies designed to tackle the drug-use problem. For 
example, it funded a part-time School Resource Officer from the local 
sheriff’s office to intervene in any campus incidents, instituted staff 
substance-abuse and violence-prevention training, and created 
counseling and preventionist positions.172 
Despite these efforts, drug problems persisted. In the spring of 1998, 
for example, forty percent of sophomores and forty-two percent of 
seniors identified themselves as users of illegal drugs.173 Nineteen 
percent of sophomores and twelve and one-half percent of seniors had 
used drugs in the past thirty days.174 The 1998 numbers, however, 
represented lower drug-use levels than the state average in twenty-three 
of thirty-two subcategories175 and constituted lower usage numbers than 
found in the 1994 survey.176 
                                                     
168. Id. at 555, 13 P.3d at 247. 
169. Brief of Respondents at 1, York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 163 Wash. 2d 297, 178 P.3d 995 
(2008) (No. 78946-1), 2006 WL 4286298. 
170. Id. at 4. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 3–4. 
173. Id. at 5; York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 163 Wash. 2d 297, 300, 178 P.3d 995, 998 (2008). 
174. Brief of Respondents, supra note 169, at 5; York, 163 Wash. 2d at 300, 178 P.3d at 998. 
175. Brief of Appellants at 4–5, York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 163 Wash. 2d 297, 178 P.3d 995 
(2008) (No. 78946-1), 2006 WL 4286297. 
176. Brief of Respondents, supra note 169, at 4–5. 
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With these data before it in 1999, the District’s Board of Directors 
implemented a mandatory drug-testing program that relied on urinalysis 
for all student-athletes. The testing regime required, as a condition of 
participating in school athletics, that students be tested initially, and it 
subjected them to random tests during the season.177 
Students were forced to produce urine samples at the Wahkiakum 
County Health Department.178 Samples were then sent to an independent 
laboratory for analysis.179 Students provided urine samples in a closed 
bathroom stall, with a health department official in the doorway to the 
bathroom or just inside it and a school official at the other end of the 
hallway.180 Student-athletes who tested positive were suspended from 
school athletics, but the results were not passed on to law enforcement, 
and there were no academic consequences.181 
The York plaintiffs consisted of parents whose children were tested 
under the Wahkiakum School District policy. Hans York, a deputy 
sheriff with Wahkiakum County, was the father of Aaron and Abraham 
York, who were tested in the 1999–2000 school year.182 Paul Schneider, 
a community doctor, was the father of Tristan Schneider, who was tested 
in the 2000–2001 year.183 
The Yorks184 filed suit in 1999, alleging the policy violated Section 7 
of the Washington Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and seeking a preliminary injunction.185 Although the trial 
judge denied the preliminary injunction,186 he agreed that the policy 
violated the students’ “privacy rights” and issued an order requiring that 
test results be sent to the court and then to students’ doctors for 
appropriate action.187 Perhaps loath to saddle such a burden, the District 
                                                     
177. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 300–01, 178 P.3d at 998. 
178. Brief of Respondents, supra note 169, at 7. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 301, 178 P.3d at 998. 
182. Id.; Brief of Appellants, supra note 175, at 13. 
183. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 301, 178 P.3d at 998; Brief of Appellants, supra note 175, at 13. 
184. The Schneiders did not join the action until after their daughter was tested in the 2000–2001 
school year. 
185. Brief of Appellants, supra note 175, at 14. The Fourth Amendment claim was dropped after 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Earls. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 301 n.4, 178 P.3d at 
998. 
186. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 301–02, 178 P.3d at 998–99. 
187. Brief of Appellants, supra note 175, at 14. 
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voluntarily suspended testing while the trial court’s ruling was 
appealed.188 In June 2006, the trial court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the School District on the grounds that the federal “special 
needs exception” authorized the suspicionless testing regime.189 The 
Supreme Court of Washington granted the families’ petition for direct 
review.190 
The families argued that the District’s testing regime violated Section 
7 because it implicated a private affair without authority of law. The 
families noted Washington’s long history of protecting bodily 
functions191 and asserted that “it is practically beyond dispute that 
governmental actors disturb individuals’ ‘private affairs,’ by the entire 
process of mandatory urinalysis.”192 As for “authority of law,” the 
families maintained that while only reasonable suspicion is required for 
a school search, Kuehn “squarely refused to extend this exception to 
cover suspicionless searches for drugs or alcohol.”193 As such, the trial 
court’s special-needs test was at odds with Washington law.194 
Whereas the families’ departure point was the broader protections of 
Section 7, the School District started with the Fourth Amendment. The 
District argued that Section 7’s protections in schools were 
commensurate with those of the Fourth Amendment.195 It drew support 
for this contention from the appellate court’s dictum in Brooks that 
“article 1, section 7 affords students no greater protections from searches 
                                                     
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 15–16. 
190. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 302, 178 P.3d at 999. 
191. Brief of Appellants, supra note 175, at 20 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 70.24.330 (year 
omitted in original) (establishing freedom from HIV testing without consent, with limited 
exceptions); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash. App. 795, 810, 10 P.3d 452, 460 (2000) 
(“Preexisting state law reflects a consistent protection of privacy of the body and bodily 
functions.”); City of Tukwila v. Nalder, 53 Wash. App. 746, 749–52, 770 P.2d 670, 673–74 (1989) 
(bathroom stalls have subjective and objective privacy); State v. Berber, 48 Wash. App. 583, 589, 
740 P.2d 863, 867 (1987) (bathroom stalls have subjective and objective privacy); State v. Rochelle, 
11 Wash. App. 887, 892, 527 P.2d 87, 90 (1974) (urinalysis tests are privileged part of doctor-
patient relationship). 
192. Id. at 24 (citing Robinson, 102 Wash. App. at 818, 10 P.3d at 456 (“It is difficult to imagine 
an affair more private than the passing of urine.”); State v. White, 129 Wash. 2d 105, 111, 915 P.2d 
1089, 1102 (1996) (“[A]n individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect to those 
bodily functions which take place in a bathroom stall.”). 
193. Id. at 29 (emphasis in original). 
194. See id. at 17, 29–30. 
195. Brief of Respondents, supra note 169, at 13.  
KEREM FEB2009.DOC 3/8/2009  12:18 PM 
School Searches in Washington 
115 
by school officials than is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”196 The 
District argued that the families’ reliance on Kuehn’s individual 
suspicion standard was misplaced as it was based on the Fourth 
Amendment, and not Section 7, and was thus subsequently overruled by 
T.LO., and presumably, its progeny.197 Because the District viewed 
Section 7 as “coextensive with the Fourth Amendment”198 in the school 
context, it asked that the court uphold the testing regime under the 
federal special-needs test and its post-T.L.O. development.199 
B. The York Court Unanimously Invalidated the Program but Failed 
to Produce a Majority Opinion 
The York court’s nine justices unanimously condemned the School 
Districts’ testing regime.200 A majority opinion did not emerge, however, 
because the justices could not agree as to whether suspicionless testing 
could ever be countenanced. Justice Sanders, joined by Chief Justice 
Alexander and Justices Owens and Chambers, argued that suspicionless 
searches were nearly always impermissible under the Washington 
Constitution.201 Justice Madsen, joined by Justices Charles Johnson, 
Fairhurst, and Bridge,202 believed that such searches could pass 
constitutional muster where a state actor could show that individualized 
suspicion could not detect the illicit conduct.203 Justice Jim Johnson, for 
his part, argued that testing would be permissible where it was narrowly 
drawn to advance a compelling state interest.204 
Every justice agreed that the School District’s testing regime 
implicated students’ private affairs. The lead opinion cited state and 
federal authority for the proposition that a “student athlete has a genuine 
and fundamental privacy interest in controlling his or her own bodily 
                                                     
196. Id. (quoting State v. Brooks, 43 Wash. App. 560, 568, 718 P.2d 837, 841 (1986)). 
197. Id. at 14. 
198. Id. at 33. 
199. Id. at 37, 46. 
200. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 163 Wash. 2d 297, 316, 178 P.3d 995, 1006 (2008); id. at 
329, 178 P.3d at 1012 (Madsen, J., concurring); id. at 345–46, 178 P.3d at 1021 (Johnson, J.M., J., 
concurring). 
201. Id. at 315–16, 178 P.3d at 1005–06. 
202. Retired Justice Bobbe Bridge served in a pro tem capacity in place of the recused Justice 
Stephens.  
203. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 323–24, 178 P.3d at 1010 (Madsen, J., concurring). 
204. Id. at 342, 178 P.3d at 1019 (Johnson, J.M., J., concurring). 
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functions.”205 The Madsen concurrence also found that the test infringed 
on students’ privacy, saying it was “difficult to understand how the 
necessity to share locker rooms and restrooms diminishes a student’s 
expectation that their excretory functions will not be subject to 
governmental intrusion absent particularized suspicion of 
wrongdoing.”206 
Justice Jim Johnson, by contrast, was reluctant to dismiss the potential 
for participation in athletics to diminish a student athlete’s privacy 
interest. For him, athletes had diminished privacy expectations due to 
mandatory annual physical exams, the lack of urinal or shower dividers 
in locker rooms, and the risk of performance-enhancing drug use.207 
Nevertheless, Justice Johnson agreed with his eight colleagues that the 
urinalysis program was an invasion of this diminished privacy 
expectation.208 
The three opinions differed, however, on whether proper authority of 
law for the search existed based on the special-needs exception to the 
warrant requirement. The lead opinion refused to adopt the federal 
special-needs exception, stating that Washington had long invalidated 
searches that are not based on at least reasonable suspicion. 209 The court 
cited Kuehn for the proposition that a suspicionless luggage check 
“violated both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7.”210 Thus, 
for the lead opinion, Kuehn established that searches without individual 
suspicion are “anathema to the Fourth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 7 
protections.”211 
The lead opinion discounted two Washington cases that had 
sanctioned suspicionless searches for convicts. First, Justice Sanders 
distinguished In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E212—a case that countenanced 
mandatory HIV testing for convicted juvenile sexual offenders without 
                                                     
205. Id. at 308, 178 P.3d at 1002. 
206. Id. at 327, 178 P.3d at 1012. 
207. Id. at 332–34, 178 P.3d at 1014–15. 
208. Id. at 334, 178 P.3d at 1015. 
209. Id. at 314–15, 178 P.3d at 1005 (citing State v. Jorden, 160 Wash. 2d 121, 127, 156 P.3d 
893, 896 (2007) (“[T]his court has consistently expressed displeasure with random and 
suspicionless searches, reasoning that they amount to nothing more than an impermissible fishing 
expedition.”); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 458–60, 755 P.2d 775, 777–78 (1988) 
(holding that suspicionless sobriety checkpoints violated Section 7 because they interfered with 
private affairs and lacked authority of law). 
210. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 315, 178 P.3d at 1005. 
211. Id. 
212. 121 Wash. 2d 80, 847 P.2d 455 (1993). 
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individualized suspicion—as based “exclusively” on Fourth Amendment 
precedent.213 Justice Sanders also distinguished State v. Surge,214 a 2007 
case in which the court upheld mandatory DNA testing of convicted 
felons not because it found authority of law, but because, unlike the case 
before the court, it did not implicate a private affair.215 He also 
emphasized that these cases had limited applicability to the school 
context as they involved convicted felons and thus “present[ed] far 
different factual situations from drug testing student athletes.”216 
Finally, the lead opinion rejected the special-needs exception for its 
lack of a limiting principle, stating that “we can conceive of no way to 
draw a principled line permitting drug testing only student athletes.”217 
Justice Sanders feared that countenancing suspicionless drug testing of 
student-athletes would allow school districts to “test[] students 
participating in any extracurricular activities, as federal courts now 
allow, or test[] the entire student population . . . .”218 
The Madsen concurrence, by contrast, believed that special needs 
could justify suspicionless school searches in some circumstances. 
Justice Madsen proposed a rule somewhat like the federal special-needs 
exception, but placed greater emphasis on the impracticability of 
individualized suspicion. Like the federal standard, Justice Madsen’s 
proposed exception would apply only if there were a special need 
beyond law enforcement, and the warrant and probable-cause 
requirements were impracticable.219 Justice Madsen argued, however, 
that a Washington special-needs doctrine should only be applied where 
individual suspicion was unworkable.220 
To determine unworkability, according to Justice Madsen, courts 
should “consider both the opportunities for developing the requisite 
individualized suspicion and the severity of the consequences that may 
ensue by failing to detect illicit conduct.”221 Justice Madsen stated that 
individual suspicion can be unworkable in two situations: first, when the 
                                                     
213. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 313, 178 P.3d at 1004. 
214. 160 Wash. 2d 65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007). 
215. Id. at 315, 178 P.3d at 1005–06. 
216. Id. at 315, 178 P.3d at 1006. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 315–16, 178 P.3d at 1006. 
219. Id. at 319, 178 P.3d at 1007 (Madsen, J., concurring). 
220. Id. at 321–22, 178 P.3d at 1009. 
221. Id. at 324, 178 P.3d 995 at 1010. 
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object of the search is unrelated to criminal activity, which would render 
the concepts of probable cause and individualized suspicion inapt,222 and 
second, when the object of the search is hidden or latent, presenting 
inadequate opportunities for detection.223 
The Madsen concurrence drew support for its contention that 
suspicionless searches could be permissible primarily from Juveniles and 
Surge. It argued that Juveniles recognized a Washington common-law 
special-needs exception that justified searches without individualized 
suspicion.224 Surge more generally supported suspicionless searches by 
“address[ing] the special needs exception,” but the court in Surge “had 
no need to address whether the special needs exception would have 
provided . . . ‘authority of law’ under article I, section 7” because no 
private affair was implicated by the facts of that case.225 
Justice Madsen applied her proposed rule to the District’s policy of 
mandatory urinalysis and struck it down. Because drug use has 
observable manifestations and students are under constant observation 
from teachers and administrators, she argued, those officials would 
likely be able to “supply the particularized suspicion necessary to 
support a search.”226 
Justice Jim Johnson took exception to the lead opinion’s broad rule 
that special needs could never justify suspicionless testing, and differed 
with Justice Madsen’s focus on the impracticability of individualized 
suspicion. His proposed standard would require that special-needs 
searches “advance compelling interests, show narrow tailoring, and 
employ a less intrusive method of testing.”227 Justice Johnson effectively 
proposed a balancing test, asserting that the gravity of the state interest 
should be weighed against the importance of the privacy interest to be 
invaded.228 
Justice Johnson concluded that the District’s program failed his test. 
He wrote that the testing program was not narrowly tailored because 
“there was no showing that athletes used drugs at a higher rate than other 
students or that testing the athletes would address the drug problem 
                                                     
222. Id. at 323–24, 178 P.3d at 1010. 
223. Id. at 324, 178 P.3d at 1010. 
224. Id. at 318, 178 P.3d at 1007. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 325, 178 P.3d at 1010–11. 
227. Id. at 342, 178 P.3d at 1019 (Johnson, J.M., J., concurring). 
228. Id. at 342–43, 178 P.3d at 1019–20. 
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among the general student body.”229 He also took issue with the level of 
intrusion, noting the availability of “saliva samples or sweat patches, 
which are significantly less intrusive and humiliating.”230 
V. SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES ERODE JURISPRUDENTIAL, 
DEMOCRATIC, AND EDUCATIONAL VALUES 
In York, five justices of the Supreme Court of Washington seemed 
ready to jettison Section 7’s requirement of individualized suspicion for 
certain school searches. In its place, they would have used some variant 
of a balancing test. While the Madsen and Johnson concurrences 
propose different standards, both are grounded in the federal special-
needs exception—an exception that allows for suspicionless searches in 
several contexts, including schools.231 
The Kuehn court described a foundational principle of Washington 
law: for a search to be valid, it must be based on individualized 
suspicion.232 Because Kuehn was a § 1983 case, the court’s Section 7 
discussion was unnecessary to its holding. In the context of school 
searches, the Supreme Court of Washington nonetheless took pains to 
describe suspicionless searches as “anathema to Fourth Amendment and 
Const. art. I § 7 protections.”233 Only four days later, T.L.O. lowered the 
school-search predicate, but did not reach the individualized suspicion 
question. 
Today, with the insight that decades of federal special-needs doctrinal 
development provide as to its effects, Washington courts should hold 
fast to Kuehn’s requirement of individualized suspicion. The federal 
special-needs exception has proven to be highly malleable and prone to 
expansion.234 In the school context, it undermines both educational and 
democratic values. Rather than follow the federal lead, Washington 
courts should maintain their independent search-and-seizure 
jurisprudence and strictly adhere to an individualized-suspicion 
requirement for school searches. 
                                                     
229. Id. at 344, 178 P.3d at 1020. 
230. Id. at 345, 178 P.3d at 1021. 
231. See infra Section IV.B for a detailed discussion of York. 
232. See Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist., 103 Wash. 2d 594, 599, 601–02, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081–82 
(1985) (“We never authorize general, exploratory searches.”) (quoting State v. Helmka, 86 Wash. 
2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115, 117 (1975) (internal markings omitted)). 
233. Id. at 601–02, 694 P.2d at 1082 (emphasis added). 
234. See infra, notes 235–41, and accompanying text. 
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A. Washington Courts Should Adhere to a Strict Individualized-
Suspicion Standard Because Suspicionless Searches Are Ill-
Defined and Prone to Expansion 
Suspicionless searches under the special-needs doctrine are 
supposedly rooted in pressing governmental needs, one of which is the 
need to maintain order in schools. In practice, however, the 
circumstances that have allowed for their application are extremely 
malleable. As one commentator observed, “[L]ittle or no effort has been 
made to explain what these ‘special needs’ are; the term turns out to be 
no more than a label that indicates when a lax standard will apply.”235 
The result is something akin to rational-basis review: where the standard 
applies, the search regime will be upheld.236 
This irregularity exists because judges do not have bright-line rules to 
constrain their decisions, like the requirements of probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion. Instead, they can engage in “a factual tug-of-war,” 
where “[f]acts can be emphasized or ignored in order to reach a 
preordained result.”237 Justice Brennan now appears prophetic in his 
characterization of T.L.O.’s balancing test as a method of “reaching a 
predetermined conclusion.”238 
The malleability of special-needs is related to another problem: it can 
apply almost anywhere, as it has no real limiting principles. The school 
cases illustrate two manifestations of this problem. First, the degree of 
immediacy required for the special need has been steadily eroded in 
federal courts. The U.S. Supreme Court relied upon a rampant and 
pressing drug problem to justify drug testing in Acton.239 Only seven 
years later, in Earls, the Court described those facts as “not essential to 
the holding” when it upheld mandatory testing of any student participant 
in extracurricular activities based on the nationwide drug epidemic.240 
Second, the degree of diminished privacy interests of the group to be 
tested has also been undermined. The Earls Court deemed the 
                                                     
235. William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 
STAN. L. REV. 553, 554 (1992). 
236. Id. 
237. George M. Dery III, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy Than Schoolchildren? How 
Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of Fourth Amendment “Special Needs” Balancing, 40 
ARIZ. L. REV. 73, 88–89 (1998). 
238. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 367 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
239. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662–63 (1995). 
240. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002). 
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diminished privacy interests of student-athletes that helped justify 
suspicionless drug testing in Acton “not essential to our decision.”241 
The standards proposed by Justices Madsen and Johnson bear these 
same central flaws. The Madsen concurrence purports to constrain the 
special-needs exception by requiring the state to show that the 
individualized-suspicion requirement is impracticable.242 The 
impracticability requirement itself is subject to manipulation, however, 
as courts would weigh “opportunities for developing the requisite 
individualized suspicion and the severity of the consequences that may 
ensue by failing to detect illicit conduct.”243 Both considerations invite 
courts to engage in a “factual tug-of-war,”244 emphasizing certain facts 
to the exclusion of others to “reach[] a predetermined conclusion.”245 
Justice Johnson’s proposal poses the same risk as the highly manipulable 
federal special-needs category. His compelling-interest schema relies 
upon the kind of balancing that promotes uncertainty and expansion.246 
The Madsen concurrence’s impracticability restriction on 
suspicionless searches could equally prove ineffectual. Justice Madsen’s 
malleable standard constitutes an invitation to lower courts to expand 
suspicionless searches to other contexts. The potential for expansion 
posed by standards without limiting principles is already apparent in 
Washington case law. For example, despite a clear directive from the 
Juveniles court that its holding “applies only to convicted sex 
offenders . . . . [t]here are no other ‘groups’ included—either explicitly 
or implicitly,”247 it was seized upon by both the Madsen and Johnson 
concurrences in York as support for suspicionless testing.248 
The lesson is clear: suspicionless searches in one area are likely to 
lead to suspicionless searches in other areas. Given Section 7’s textual 
foundation in the bright-line authority-of-law requirement, Washington 
                                                     
241. Id. at 831. 
242. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 163 Wash. 2d 297, 323, 178 P.3d 995, 1009 (2008) 
(Madsen, J., concurring). 
243. Id. at 324, 178 P.3d at 1010. 
244. Dery, supra note 237, at 88. 
245. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 367 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
246. See York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 163 Wash. 2d 297, 343, 178 P.3d 995, 1019–20 (2008) 
(Johnson, J.M., J., concurring) (“Thus, the greater the intrusion into constitutional rights, the more 
compelling the interests must be.”). 
247. In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash. 2d 80, 96, 847 P.2d 455, 462 (1993). 
248. See York, 163 Wash. 2d at 318, 178 P.3d at 1007 (Madsen, J., concurring); id. at 335–36, 
178 P.3d at 1016 (Johnson, J.M., J., concurring). 
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courts should avoid eroding citizens’ rights through such a malleable 
doctrine. Washington courts must hold fast to the Kuehn court’s 
powerful principle that “[i]n the absence of individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing, the search is a general search. We never authorize general, 
exploratory searches.”249 
B.  Suspicionless Searches Will Damage Students’ Understanding of 
Democratic Government and Undermine Trust Relationships 
Furthermore, suspicionless searches would have serious negative 
repercussions if the state were to perform them on Washington students, 
who take cues about appropriate behavior from teachers, school 
officials, and other authority figures.250 Especially where teachers are 
charged with teaching civic responsibilities and rights, students look to 
them for guidance on the fundamental freedoms of the federal and 
Washington systems of government.251 Subjecting students to blanket 
suspicionless searches teaches students that constitutional protections do 
not apply to them.252 Where drug testing is concerned, students learn that 
their body is just another object to be regulated.253 In fact, while on the 
stand at trial, James Acton’s father lamented the lessons the Vernonia 
School District was teaching his son: “[S]uspicionless testing sends a 
                                                     
249. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist., 103 Wash. 2d 594, 599, 694 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1985) (internal 
markings omitted) (quoting State v. Helmka, 86 Wash. 2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115, 117 (1975)). 
250. See Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 239 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (noting that 
students look to teachers and authority figures for models of appropriate behavior). 
251. See Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d at 601, 694 P.2d at 1082 (lamenting the damage done to student 
understanding of constitutional freedoms when student rights are violated by officials “entrusted 
with teaching civic responsibilities”); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 855 (2002) 
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting that a school’s role in educating students for citizenship demands 
strong protection of constitutional rights) (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 637 (1943)). 
252. See Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“We do not know what class petitioner was attending when the police and dogs burst in, 
but the lesson the school authorities taught her that day will undoubtedly make a greater impression 
than the one her teacher had hoped to convey. I would grant certiorari to teach petitioner another 
lesson: that the Fourth Amendment protects ‘[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,’ . . . .” (quoting U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV)). 
253. See Martin R. Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom—Perspectives on Fourth 
Amendment Scope, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 803, 845 (1980) (noting that questioning one’s innocence 
without cause makes one “a piece of criminal evidence, an object to be probed”). 
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message to children that are trying to be responsible citizens that they 
have to prove that they’re innocent.”254 
The Supreme Court of Washington has recognized this danger, 
cautioning in two different cases when the rights of teenagers were 
violated that “[t]he damage to the understanding of constitutional 
guaranties of freedom from unreasonable searches on the part of these 
young persons is incalculable.”255 Indeed, the court cautioned that 
searches in schools were grounds for stronger protection of 
constitutional liberties: “That [the schools] are educating the young for 
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional 
freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its 
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our 
government as mere platitudes.”256 
Blanket, suspicionless searches also undermine teachers’ and school 
officials’ ability to form and rely on relationships of trust with their 
students.257 Many teachers rely on trust with their students—just as 
many parents come to rely on the honesty of their children—to maintain 
order and appropriately discipline students.258 Erosion of these trust 
relationships engenders disobedience, thus handicapping the educational 
process.259 Turning schools into “enclaves of totalitarianism”260 where 
students constantly fear the invasion of their private affairs threatens to 
                                                     
254. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 682 (1995) (internal markings omitted). 
255. Kuehn, 103 Wash. 2d at 601, 694 P.2d at 1082 (internal markings omitted) (quoting 
Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 674, 658 P.2d 653, 657 (1983)). 
256. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 
(1943)). 
257. See Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Education Ass’n and Drug Policy Alliance in 
Support of Appellants at 14–15, York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 163 Wash. 2d 297, 178 P.3d 995 
(2008) (No. 78946-1), 2007 WL 1685929 (“Mandatory suspicionless drug testing of students 
disrupts the fragile balance of trust between adolescents and their teachers, coaches, and 
administrators by creating an adversarial role where students are treated as guilty until proven 
innocent.”). 
258. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 682 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
259. See Brief of Amici Curiae Washington Education Ass’n and Drug Policy Alliance in 
Support of Appellants, supra note 257, at 15 (“[S]uspicionless drug testing is perceived by 
adolescents as an expression of adult mistrust and suspicion. Such perceptions, in turn, can trigger 
oppositional behavior . . . .”); Irene Merker Rosenberg, New Jersey v. T.L.O.: Of Children and 
Smokescreens, 19 FAM. L.Q. 311, 329 (1985) (arguing that allowing state invasions of privacy 
without adequate cause engenders hostility to authority, disobedience, and even crime). 
260. Jones v. Latexo Indep. Sch. Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223, 236 (E.D. Tex. 1980) (describing a 
Texas school district’s suspicionless drug searching regime, which relied on dog sniffs). 
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taint students’ role models, undermine trust relationships, and teach that 
constitutional guarantees of privacy are “mere platitudes.”261 
CONCLUSION 
Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution has a distinct and 
well-defined tradition of independent interpretation and broad 
protections, which “pose[] an almost absolute bar to warrantless arrests, 
searches and seizures.”262 Washington courts have consistently applied 
the McKinnon factors—which the Kuehn court interpreted as requiring 
individualized suspicion—when analyzing school searches. The Kuehn 
court cautioned that suspicionless searches would violate Section 7’s 
authority-of-law requirement and Washington’s tradition of privacy 
protections. The court adopted a bright-line rule barring suspicionless 
school searches. 
Decades of suspicionless-search and special-needs jurisprudence in 
federal courts have proven the wisdom of the Kuehn court’s warning. 
The vagueness of the special-needs standard allows courts to reach their 
preferred results by emphasizing certain facts to the exclusion of others. 
The lack of limiting principles makes this results-oriented approach and 
the special-needs exception prone to steady expansion. Finally, 
suspicionless searches in schools teach students that constitutional 
protections do not apply to them, while at the same time undermining 
the trust relationships that promote education. 
The standards proposed by the Madsen and Johnson concurrences 
bear these same hallmarks. Justice Madsen’s impracticability standard 
would prove a poor barrier to suspicionless searches. Like the federal 
special-needs exception, the standard would invite courts to highlight 
facts that foreshadow severe consequences for failure to detect illicit 
conduct, while minimizing facts that cut the other way. Justice Johnson’s 
standard poses the same risks: courts could rely on facts that promote a 
compelling-interest finding while downplaying those that do not. 
Suspicionless searches under either standard threaten to severely 
erode “those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and 
should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a 
warrant.”263 Given the demonstrated premium put on privacy rights in 
                                                     
261. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist., 103 Wash. 2d 594, 601, 694 P.2d 1078, 1082 (1985) (quoting 
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
262. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983). 
263. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984). 
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Washington,264 Washington courts should maintain a requirement of 
individualized suspicion in the school context and reject suspicionless 
searches. 
 
                                                     
264. See State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 349, 979 P.2d 833, 837 (1999) (“[W]hile the Fourth 
Amendment operates on a downward ratcheting mechanism of diminishing expectations of privacy, 
article I, section 7, holds the line . . . .”). 
